He had a solid educational background and having worked with him for a long time made his predecessor believe in him and calmly handed over power to him. He didn’t know that he was dealing with a Serrano. As someone trusted by Amadou Ahidjo, he backed down when he soon realized that his successor was not living up to the principles of the then ruling party. He was quick enough to read between the lines and the chameleon hit a sore spot by not implementing the policies of the then Cameroon National Union (CNU). This was really proof that he was either a louse on his predecessor’s body or a cog in the wheel.

Amadou Ahidjo’s inability to weather the storm precipitated him into sensing danger and he received Biya poorly when he visited Ngoundere in 1983. He soon realized that he was trying to back the wrong horse and thus had an eye of Argus. . He then advocated that his teammates and northern ministers resign from the Biya regime, to which he responded by reshuffling the cabinet and ousting them. A lot of events ranging from the failed attempts to eliminate Biya to the 1984 coup took place because he was really a thorn in his flesh.

Between March and August 1983 there were futile attempts allegedly orchestrated by Amadou Ahidjo to eliminate Biya. This was possible because he had some hands on his farm. First was the attempt to exterminate Biya during the May 20 celebration in Yaoundé, where he escaped death by the skin of his teeth. Biya also felt the danger and boycotted a politburo meeting on June 19 of the same year, so he still narrowly escaped death. He narrowly escaped death again during the military graduation ceremony for officers at the Military Academy (EMIA) and on August 7, 1983 in a football match between Canon Yaounde and Union Douala in the Cup final. from Cameroon, another effort was made to finish off Biya. after which he confronted himself. After this series of stab wounds to eliminate Biya, he became quite wary and, with the help of his collaborators, he was always being hinted at for assassination attempts. He also tightened the security around him and the poor planning of assassination plans by his opponents gave him an edge to be wise.

The immediate causes of the dark coup of April 6, 1984 can be attributed to the fact that the president of the CNU and the newly appointed president had contradictory ideas only to support the tension that was already brewing between Ahidjo and Biya. The North-South divide became quite prominent when high-ranking military officers from the North were dismissed during the cabinet reshuffle and Biya quickly transferred the Republican Guard Unit. At 3:05 p.m. on April 6, 1984, Captain Awal Abassi and Colonel Ibrahim Saleh together with some mutineers attacked the presidency, the Military General Headquarters and the National radio station which was turned off by a journalist and the message about the coup it was circulating only in Yaoundé Although the airport was surrounded by the insurgents as early as 7:00 am, it was later recaptured by forces loyal to Biya by the 11th Ebolowa Infantry Battalion under Colonel Titus Ebogo with reinforcement of Koutaba Air Force troops.

Borrowing a page from neighboring Nigeria, where a number of successful coups have been carried out, it can be said that the coup plotters did not use surprise, which is indispensable in a military coup. The air force was not put out of action, which led to the reconquest of the airport. The inability to completely neutralize the military high command loyal to Biya and the fact that the strategic sites already taken by the rebels were not well protected facilitated the reconquest. Above all, the leader of the mutineers in a radio statement fearfully spoke on the radio that people needed to doubt the story.

Whether the hit was successful or not, the damage was enormous. The putschists were sentenced to death while others were executed instantly. Some 235 gendarmes were killed and some 1,053 rebels captured. Some high-ranking ministers were removed from their positions by Biya and the republican guard was disbanded and placed under the National Gendarmerie Delegation. The presidency was then guarded by the Armed Forces General Headquarters Regiment.

If an antecedent can peacefully hand power over to a trusted successor even if he later failed, why can’t the descendant hand it over to someone else as well? Coups and post-election violence must not be a means to regime change because those who appreciate the sweetness of honey must have tasted something bitter. A good actor knows when to leave the stage, except that he wants to be a cyborg.